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Abstract
In this study, the income management strategies of  Canadian couples are examined using data 
from the 2007 General Social Survey. The extent to which “older” couples, in which at least one 
spouse or partner is aged 45 or older, employ an allocative, pooled, or separate strategy is explored. 
Results show that the income management strategies used by these couples are correlated with 
relationship characteristics, such as common-law status, duration of  relationship, and presence of  
children. As well, the likelihood of  using a separate approach is positively correlated with levels 
of  educational attainment and with the amount of  income received by wives or female partners. 
Keywords: income management, intra-household allocation, older couples.
Résumé
La présente étude examine les stratégies de gestion du revenu des couples canadiens dont au 
moins un des conjoints ou partenaires est âgé de 45 ans et plus à l’aide des données de l’Enquête 
sociale générale de 2007. L’objectif  est de déterminer dans quelle mesure les couples optent 
pour l’allocation, la mise en commun ou la séparation des revenus. Les résultats révèlent que 
les stratégies de gestion du revenu adoptées par les couples sont liées aux caractéristiques de 
la relation, dont l’union libre, la durée de la relation et la présence d’enfants. En outre, la 
probabilité de séparer les revenus est liée positivement au niveau de scolarité et au montant du 
revenu de la femme.
Mots-clés : gestion du revenu, allocation intra-ménage, couples.
* The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not 
reflect the position of Statistics Canada.Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
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Introduction
The last 30 years have witnessed substantial changes in the characteristics of 
Canadian families. Common-law unions have become more prevalent, the number 
of Canadians experiencing a divorce in their lifetime has increased, and blended 
or mixed families are more numerous than they were in the past. Labour market 
characteristics of families have also changed, reflecting the widespread entry of 
women into the paid labour force and their increasing contribution to family in-
comes. Attitudes regarding the roles of women and men in the labour force and 
in the home have also changed (Crompton et al. 2003). These developments have 
led researchers in a number of disciplines to re-examine the economic behaviours 
of families—how they make decisions about employment and consumption, how 
they balance paid and unpaid work, how they organize their income, and so on. 
Although policymakers often assume that family decisions follow the unitary 
model à la Becker (1981), sociologists, economic psychologists, feminist econo-
mists, and, now, economists in general agree that such decisions and outcomes are 
shaped by intra-household negotiations between family members, particularly part-
ners in married and common-law couples. Negotiations are influenced by factors 
such as the strength of each partner’s bargaining position, expectations regarding 
the permanence of the relationship, and the balance between self-interest and col-
lective interests. 
In this paper, data from the 2007 General Social Survey (GSS) are used to 
examine the income management strategies of older Canadian couples, that is, 
couples in which at least one spouse or partner is aged 45 or older. We examine 
the extent to which couples use an allocative strategy of income management, in 
which one spouse or partner manages the couple’s income and allocates a share to 
the other; a pooled strategy, in which both spouses or partners pool their incomes, 
with each taking out what he or she needs; or a separate strategy, in which spouses 
or partners keep their incomes partially or completely separate. The demographic 
and financial characteristics associated with these strategies are examined, and the 
extent to which observable characteristics account for the marked differences in 
the strategies used by married couples and common-law couples is estimated.
This study provides a useful complement to recent qualitative studies on this 
issue, estimating the incidence and correlates of income management strategies 
across a representative sample of the population. Furthermore, the analysis uses a 
more complete set of socioeconomic variables than is often available in quantita-
tive studies. For example, Vogler et al. (2006), as well as Heimdal and Houseknecht 
(2003), document differences in the income management strategies of married and 
common-law couples, but are not able to determine the extent to which this reflects 
any systematic differences in the duration of these relationships, or in the presence 
or parentage of children. Other studies focus on either married (Treas 1993) or 
common-law couples (Winkler 1997; Elizabeth 2001). Consequently, the objective 
of this analysis is to examine the socioeconomic covariates associated with income 
management strategies, using a large, nationally representative survey that contains 
more complete information on respondent characteristics than has been available 
to date. Issues of gender inequality and power relationships, which are the focus of 
many studies of income management, are beyond the scope of this analysis.Laporte, Schellenberg: Income management strategies of older couples in Canada
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Literature review 
Economists have been grappling with economic behaviour at the household 
level for many years. The traditional economic approach—the unitary model—most-
ly extends individual models of economic behaviour to households (Samuelson 
1956; Becker 1973, 1981). The unitary model assumes that a household acts as a 
single decision-making unit, maximizing a single household utility function, subject 
to a single budget constraint. The model also imposes important restrictions, such 
as income pooling, whereby only total exogenous family income (and not its dis-
tribution across household members) matters for labour supply and consumption 
decisions, and provides for symmetry in the cross-wage effects on the labour supply 
of each household member, whereby a change in the wife’s labour supply following 
a change in her husband’s wage will be equal to the change in the husband’s labour 
supply following a change in his wife’s wage. Both income pooling and symmetry 
restrictions have been strongly rejected in empirical studies (Phipps and Burton 
1996; Fortin and Lacroix 1997). The model has also been criticized on the grounds 
that it leaves no room for determining the intra-household allocation of consump-
tion and labour supply. As Phipps and Burton summed up, the unitary model “…
ignores the rather obvious fact that the family is made up of individuals with unique 
tastes and preferences who may or may not always agree—who may or may not 
have equal powers—who may or may not be equally well off” (1995: 179).
Partly for these reasons, new approaches have been developed based on in-
dividual preferences which use game theory (e.g., Chiappori 1988; Kooreman and 
Kapteyn 1990; McElroy 1990). However, it is the collective model of Chiappori 
(1992) that has opened the “black box” of family economic behaviour. In the 
collective model, family members are characterized as having their own preferences 
and interests, and bargaining is assumed to take place among household members. 
The bargaining process is influenced by a sharing rule, with the model assuming 
only that bargaining outcomes result in Pareto-efficient allocations of household 
resources. The model does not impose restrictions such as income pooling or sym-
metry of cross-wage effects. While the unitary model has been rejected in empiri-
cal studies, the collective model could not be rejected on the basis of either expen-
diture (Bourguigon et al. 1993) or labour supply (Fortin and Lacroix 1997) data.
The themes of intra-household negotiation and bargaining evident in collective 
models proposed by economists are also central themes in other disciplines. For ex-
ample, some consumer researchers argue that women’s entry into the paid labour 
force and their receipt of earnings have strengthened women’s bargaining position 
within the home and changed the way that consumption decisions are made. Belch 
and Willis (2002) report that women within couples now play a greater role in the 
purchase of automobiles, family vacations, and insurance and financial services 
than they did in the mid-1980s and that decisions in these product areas have 
shifted from a husband-dominated process to a joint decision-making process. 
Intra-household negotiation and differences in power, material conditions, and 
risk are central themes in feminist research as well. The extent to which the entry 
of women into the paid labour has resulted in a renegotiation of household issues, 
such as domestic labour, work-family balance, child care, and income manage-
ment, is a central theme in the literature (Tichenor 2005; Vogler 2005). Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
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Finally, economic psychology analyzes who makes the decisions and what 
characterizes the decision-making process within the family. In this field, income 
pooling is a subtle matter: couples may agree to pool income but their spending 
from the joint account may depend on who is earning the money. This definition 
differs from the unitary economic model, where consumption (and labour) deci-
sions are independent of the distribution of income. Bonke and Browning (2009) 
tried to close the gap between economics and economic psychology using infor-
mation on the assignment of expenditures (who bought the goods for whom). 
They found that distribution of consumption does depend on the distribution of 
income for households that declared not pooling their income, but this result is 
not found for pooling households. 
Organization of income is one issue within this broader theme of household 
economic behaviour and intra-household negotiation. In the 1980s, Jan Pahl con-
ceptualized (1986) and applied a four-part income management classification, cap-
turing gradations of control over income exercised by spouses or partners (Heim-
dal and Houseknecht 2003). Pahl’s typology of income management includes: (1) 
the whole wage system; (2) the housekeeping allowance system, in which one spouse or 
partner maintains control over the household budget and allocates a share or set 
amount to the other; (3) the pooled or shared management system, in which income is 
put into a common pot and used as needed by both spouses or partners; and (4) 
the independent management system, in which spouses or partners maintain separate 
control over their incomes and how they are spent. 
Other qualitative and survey-based studies have also focused on the preva-
lence of allocative, pooled, and separate-income management strategies (Vogler 
and Pahl 1993; Burgoyne and Morison 1997; Burgoyne et al. 2007). It should be 
noted that these strategies do not tell us about how equitably income and expenses 
are shared between spouses or partners. For example, the relative size of a spouse 
or partner’s share of income under the allocative approach is not specified, nor is 
there any guarantee that spouses or partners using a pooled strategy have equal 
access to funds, or draw comparable amounts for personal expenditures. Similarly, 
spouses or partners who separate their income may or may not contribute equally 
(or equitably) to expenses. Ashby and Burgoyne (2008) underscore the complexity 
of the issue, noting that couples that partially or completely separate their incomes 
perceive and handle money in a variety of ways (also see Vogler et al. 2006: 478). 
In short, broad categories do not capture the complex and varied ways in which 
couples manage their finances.
These caveats noted, responses to the income management question are sugges-
tive of the degree of independence that individuals within couples exercise over their 
income. Tracking 42 couples over the first year of marriage, Burgoyne et al. found that 
“those choosing more separation in money matters did so in order to maintain their 
financial identity and autonomy” (2007: 214). Similarly, Vogler states that individuals 
who use separate-income strategies “…tend to operate as two autonomous individuals 
each with their own separate accounting systems who then exchange goods and ser-
vices between them on the basis of market-like relationships” (2005: 12).1 
1. Similarly, in terms of the operation of these strategies, Vogler et al. review the literature 
and suggest that couples using a pooled approach seek “…to achieve equality of 
outcomes, in the sense of equal control over and access to joint money, even though 
they may make very different financial contributions to the pool,” while couples using a Laporte, Schellenberg: Income management strategies of older couples in Canada
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A range of characteristics have been associated with the income management 
strategies used by couples, and these can be broadly organized into three themes.
Demographic characteristics
Several studies document the correlation between demographic character-
istics of couples and the likelihood of using pooled or separate approaches to 
income management. Marital status is among these demographic characteristics, 
as common-law couples are more likely than married couples to use a separate 
approach (Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Woolley 2003; Vogler 2005). A num-
ber of possible explanations have been advanced for this. Expectations regarding 
the permanence of the relationship may be lower among common-law than mar-
ried couples, with incomes kept separate to protect self-interests in the event of 
break-up. The values espoused by individuals who self-select into common-law 
unions—such as individualism, personal autonomy, and equality of partners’ con-
tributions—may also contribute to the separation of income (Brines and Joyner 
1999; Burgoyne et al. 2006). Laws regarding the treatment of joint property are 
another consideration (Treas 1993; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003).
Several studies show that couples in which one or both partners have been 
previously divorced are more likely than others to use a separate approach to in-
come management (Treas 1993; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Woolley 2003; 
Yodanis and Lauer 2007a). Prior divorce may lower expectations of permanence 
in the current relationship and may also increase the complexity of familial and 
financial arrangements—such as the payment or receipt of child support—mak-
ing the separation of income more practical on a day-to-day basis.
Duration of the relationship is another factor. The separate approach is less 
prevalent (and the pooled approach more prevalent) among couples in longer-
term relationships (Treas 1993; Winkler 1997). This may reflect increased expecta-
tions of permanence, the acquisition of common goods over time (Burgoyne et 
al. 2007), or increased likelihood of children being born to the couple (Treas 1993; 
Winkler 1997). The presence of children born to both partners is also positively 
correlated with income pooling (Winkler 1997; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003).
Finally, a significant, but weak, relationship is often found between age and in-
come management strategies. For example, Treas (1993) found a negative, but weak, 
relationship between the wife’s age and the likelihood of using separate bank ac-
counts. Similarly, in their bivariate results, Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen (2007) showed 
that income pooling is least prevalent among couples in their twenties, but that it var-
ies by about 1 to 4 percentage points across couples in their thirties, forties, and fifties. 
Vogler et al. (2006) find a positive correlation between age and independent income 
management among male respondents but not among female respondents or among 
all respondents. As well, Yodanis and Lauer (2007a) find a significant, but weak, corre-
lation between age and income management strategies. Consequently, while younger 
individuals are often in the types of relationships in which separate-income strategies 
are used (i.e., common-law union, shorter duration, without children), the effect of 
age per se appears to be weak relative to the effect of other characteristics.
separate approach “…are much more likely to define equality in terms of equal inputs, 
in the sense that both partners make equal contributions to collective expenditure 
(‘going 50/50’) despite often having very different levels of income” (2006: 459). Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
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Income and education
Some studies have examined the correlation between income management 
strategies and the income characteristics of couples. Treas (1993) addresses this in 
terms of absolute income levels, suggesting that the correlation with income man-
agement strategies may run in either direction. On the one hand, higher-income 
couples may be more likely to use separate accounts in order to avoid the inconve-
nience of sharing. On the other hand, they may be more likely to pool their income 
if there is less concern about “free riding” or “spendthrifts” when resources are 
more plentiful. Treas finds that the likelihood of maintaining separate accounts is 
positively correlated with couples’ incomes. Heimdal and Houseknecht (2003) ob-
serve the same in the Swedish portion (but not in the American portion) of their 
sample, while Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen (2007) do not find a consistent pattern 
across household income quintiles. Vogler et al. (2006) do not include household 
income in their model, but find that the likelihood of separating income is higher 
among managerial or professional than among “working class” couples.
Another approach to resources is the relative contribution of each partner 
to the couple’s income. Certainly the circumstances for maintaining separate fi-
nances do not exist when only one spouse receives income. Beyond that, Bonke 
and Uldall-Poulson (2007) suggest that an unequal distribution of income within 
couples may increase the likelihood of separating income when spouses are “ego-
istically inclined” or the likelihood of pooling income when they are “altruistically 
inclined.” Bonke and Uldall-Poulson find that income pooling is not strongly as-
sociated with spouses’ income contributions. This is also the case with Heimdal 
and Houseknecht (2003). In contrast, Yodanis and Lauer (2007a) hypothesize that 
when the relative economic contributions of spouses approach parity couples will 
be more likely to use a pooled, rather than an allocative, approach to income man-
agement. Their results are consistent with this view. 
Net of income, Treas (1993) finds that higher levels of educational attain-
ment among women are positively associated with maintaining separate accounts. 
However, considering relative levels, Bonke and Uldall-Poulson (2007) do not find 
a significant correlation between spouses’ relative levels of education and income 
management strategies.
Attitudinal characteristics
Finally, some researchers have examined the correlation between income man-
agement strategies and other aspects of relationships, such as normative attitudes 
and personal values. For example, normative attitudes regarding gender roles are 
often based on how strongly respondents agree or disagree with declarative state-
ments. Vogler et al. (2006) find that more traditional “attitudes to breadwinning” 
are correlated with allocative income management strategies; Yodanis and Lauer 
(2007a) report a similar finding.2 However, the measure of “traditional gender ide-
ology” used by Heimdal and Houseknecht (2003) is not significantly correlated with 
income management strategies among either the Swedish or American portions 
2. For example, Vogler et al. operationalize “attitudes to breadwinning” on the basis 
of respondents’ degree of (dis)agreement with statements such as “A man’s job is to 
earn the money; a woman’s is to look after the home and family” (2006: 463).Laporte, Schellenberg: Income management strategies of older couples in Canada
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of their sample. Considering other values, Burgoyne et al. (2007) report that “…
perceived ownership of income and other assets” and a desire to maintain financial 
identity and autonomy are positively associated with the separation of income. 
Data source and methodology
Data for this paper were drawn from Statistics Canada’s 2007 General Social 
Survey (GSS). The target population for the 2007 GSS was all persons 45 years of 
age and over residing in Canada, excluding residents of Nunavut, the Yukon, and 
the Northwest Territories, and full-time residents of institutions. The 2007 GSS 
was completed by 23,404 respondents, of whom 12,854 were living with a spouse 
or common-law partner3 at the time of the survey. Excluded from this group 
were respondents for whom proxy responses were provided by another house-
hold member,4 who did not provide useable responses to the question regarding 
income management strategies,5 or who did not provide complete information on 
the independent variables in this analysis.6 Households in which family members 
aside from the couple received income were also excluded from the analysis.7 This 
was done to remove the effects of income strategies adopted for managing the 
income received by parents, children, and other members, and focus solely on 
the strategies for managing the income of husbands and wives. A final sample of 
9,489 respondents is used for the analysis. 
In terms of the age limitations of the data, results from other studies suggest a 
significant, but weak, correlation between age and income management strategies. 
We were unable to identify any studies that tested for interaction effects between 
age and other variables, such as common-law status. In spite of the age limitation 
faced, the analysis yields robust results regarding the socioeconomic characteristics 
associated with income management strategies among “older” Canadians.
2007 GSS respondents were asked: 
Which statement best describes how your household income is organized?
•  You manage all the money and give your spouse/partner their share.
•  Your spouse/partner manages all the money and gives you your share.
•  You pool all the money and each takes out what he/she needs.
•  You pool some of  the money and keep the rest.
•  You keep your own money separate.
•  Other.
3. Couples are defined as partners of opposite sex only. Same-sex couples were 
excluded from the analysis because of their small sample size (73 same-sex couples).
4. Proxy responses were provided in 618 cases, or 2.6 per cent of the sample.
5. This includes 63 respondents who reported that they use strategies “other” than the five 
responses listed in the paper and 380 respondents who either did not know what type of 
strategy they used or did not answer the question. The incidence of item non-response on 
the question was comparable to that on standard questions, such as educational attainment.
6. However, note that respondents who did not answer GSS questions regarding 
income were flagged and retained in the analysis. 
7. This resulted in the exclusion of 218 cases in which adult children (aged 25 or older) 
received income and 2,261 cases in which other family members, such as children 
aged 15 to 24 or extended-family members, received income. The inclusion of these 
cases would have made it impossible to measure the relative income contribution of 
the spouses in the sample for this study—a key variable in the literature. Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
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For this analysis, the above categories are aggregated into three groups. The 
first two categories are combined because they capture the same underlying strat-
egy identified as allocative. The third category is treated as a distinct group that is 
identified as the pooled strategy. And the fourth and fifth categories are combined 
into a single group identified as the separate strategy.8
The distribution of respondents across the three income management cat-
egories (as well as across the five original response categories) is shown in Table 1. 
Of the respondents who use the separate approach to manage their income (22.9 
per cent), about two-thirds (i.e., 15.3/22.9) reported that they and their partner 
“…keep [their] own money separate,” while about one-third (i.e., 7.6/22.9) stated 
that they and their partner “…pool some of the money and keep the rest.” In 
short, complete separation of income is more prevalent than partial separation 
within this group. In this respect, the conceptual distance between the pooled and 
separate approaches to income management is larger than it would have been had 
most respondents partially separated their income.
It is important to note that the 2007 GSS surveyed individuals rather than 
couples, with information collected from only one spouse or partner. Whether the 
other spouse or partner agrees with the respondent’s assessment of the couple’s 
approach to income management cannot be determined. In the aggregate, the 
responses provided by men and women are very similar. About 8 per cent of both 
male and female respondents stated that the husband or male partner manages 
the couple’s money and gives his wife or female partner her share, and about 12 
per cent of male and female respondents stated that the wife or female partner 
manages the income and gives her husband or male partner his share (Table 1). 
8. Again, only 63 respondents reported using another type of system, and these 
respondents have been excluded from the analysis. The categorization used in this 
study is more detailed than the two-category classification used in a number of 
studies. Vogler et al. (2008), Treas (1993), and Heimdal and Houseknecht (2003) 
combined the allocative and pooled strategies into a single category. In part, this was 
done for reasons of sample size, but Vogler et al. also argued that the allocative and 
pooled strategies are “…systems in which money is constructed as collectively owned 
and couples operate more or less as single economic units.” This is different from 
the separate strategy, which reflects “individualized systems” (2008: 120).
Table 1. Income management strategies used by individuals aged 45 or older, by 
gender, Canada, 2007.
Approaches
Male respondents Female respondents All respondents
percentage 
distribution
standard 
error
percentage 
distribution
standard 
error
percentage 
distribution
standard 
error
Allocative approach - Total 20.9 0.6 19.5 0.6 20.3 0.5
Female allocates to 
male
12.2 0.5 11.6 0.5 11.9 0.4
Male allocates to 
female
8.8 0.5 7.9 0.5 8.4 0.3
Pooled approach - Total 57.7 0.7 55.9 0.7 56.9 0.6
Separate approach - Total 21.4 0.6 24.6 0.6 22.9 0.4
Partially separate, some 
pooled
7.1 0.4 8.2 0.5 7.6 0.3
Keep their money 
separate
14.2 0.6 16.4 0.6 15.3 0.4
Note: Percentages may not add to total because of rounding. 
Source: General Social Survey, 2007.Laporte, Schellenberg: Income management strategies of older couples in Canada
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The proportions of male and female respondents reporting that they use a pooled 
or separate approach to income management are within 2 to 3 percentage points. 
Independent variables and descriptive results
This analysis includes a broad set of socioeconomic characteristics drawing 
on the information that respondents provide about themselves and about their 
spouse or partner. Respondents’ sex and age and the age of their spouse or partner 
are included. The immigration status of both the respondent and his or her spouse 
or partner are included on the grounds that income management strategies vary 
across world regions, potentially resulting in differences between individuals born 
in Canada and individuals born abroad.9 The base model includes a dummy vari-
able for each spouse or partner (Canadian-born=0, immigrant=1), and a second 
model includes four dummy variables capturing the immigration statuses of both 
spouses or partners in combination.10 
Information regarding the relationship itself is included. Distinction is made 
between individuals in common-law and marital unions, with the expectation that 
the former are more likely to separate their incomes, for the reasons discussed above. 
The duration of the current relationship and a dummy variable identifying respon-
dents who have been married before are also included. Consistent with the literature, 
it is expected that the separation of income will be correlated with shorter relation-
ships and with prior marriages. The characteristics and history of the family in which 
respondents currently reside are included. By definition, all respondents currently 
live with a spouse or common-law partner. In addition, the following are identified: 
(i) individuals who have previously had children with their current spouse or partner, 
but who are no longer residing with those children (i.e., empty-nesters); (ii) individu-
als who have not previously had children with their current spouse or partner and 
have no children residing with them (i.e., couple with no children); (iii) individuals 
living with children born to both members of the couple (i.e., couple with children); 
and (iv) individuals living with children born to one member of the couple (i.e., other 
couple). The presence of children (now or in the past) is expected to be positively 
correlated with the pooled approach to income management. 
With regard to education and income, the level of education of the respon-
dent and that of his or her spouse or partner are included, broadly defined as the 
presence of a post-secondary credential. The base model includes a dummy vari-
able for each spouse or partner (no post-secondary credential=0, post-secondary 
credential=1). The second model also includes the wife’s level of educational at-
tainment relative to that of her husband.11 Treas (1993) suggests that additional 
9. 2002 ISSP data show that the “allocative approach” is used by 3 per cent to 5 per 
cent per cent of couples in Sweden, Finland, and Norway, by about 15 per cent to 
25 per cent of couples in “Anglo” countries (the United States, United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand), by about 45 per cent to 55 per cent of couples 
in Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, and by 70 per cent of couples in the Philippines and 
Japan. Canada is not included in the 2002 ISSP. 
10. That is: both partners born in Canada (reference group); husband born in Canada and 
wife immigrated; husband immigrated and wife born in Canada; and both partners 
immigrated.
11. Since, in the GSS, education is a categorical variable, the wife or female partner’s 
education relative to that of her husband or male partner is defined as the wife or female Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
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years of education may enhance individuals’ money management skills, thereby 
increasing their capacity to maintain separate accounts, or may strengthen their 
bargaining position within the household and increase their capacity to maintain 
separate incomes, if so preferred. The income level of each partner is included in 
the base model, while the second model also includes the wife’s level of income 
relative to the husband’s.12 
Finally, a variable combining the respondent’s place of residence (defined as 
residing in Quebec or residing elsewhere in Canada) and the main language which 
the respondent uses at home (defined as English, French, or other) is included. 
This yields six categories: English outside of Quebec (reference group); French 
outside of Quebec; others outside of Quebec; English in Quebec; French in Que-
bec; and others in Quebec. 
Distribution of the sample across these characteristics, and cross-tabulations 
with income management strategies are shown in Table 2. The vast majority of in-
dividuals in the sample (89 per cent) are married, while 11 per cent are in common-
law unions. There is a 34-percentage-point difference in the share of married and 
common-law individuals using a separate-income strategy (at 19 per cent and 53 
per cent). Most individuals in the sample have been in their relationship for more 
than 20 years (71 per cent), while relatively few have been so for less than five years 
(6 per cent). There is a strong bivariate relationship between relationship duration 
and use of separate-income strategies. About half of the sample (48 per cent) are 
“empty-nesters,” about one-quarter (27 per cent) live with a spouse or partner 
with whom they have never had children, and about one-fifth (22 per cent) live 
with their spouse or partner and children born to both. Only a small portion of 
the sample resides in blended families (3 per cent); it is interesting to note that the 
use of the separate-income strategy is quite prevalent among this group (at 40 per 
cent). About one-fifth of the sample (22 per cent) has been previously married; 
consistent with the literature, separate-income strategies are prevalent among this 
group. In terms of income, there is not a noticeable bivariate correlation between 
the husband or male partner’s income and income management strategies (with 
the exception of the few who reported no income), while the use of separate-
income strategies are positively correlated with the income of the wife or female 
partner. Finally, there are significant differences in the use of separate-income 
strategies among respondents residing in Quebec and respondents residing else-
where in Canada, and among respondents who speak English, French, or other 
languages in the home.
partner’s level of education minus the husband or male partner’s level of education.
12. The GSS includes a continuous variable on respondent personal income, a 
categorical variable on household income and the number of income recipients in 
the household. From this information, it was possible to derive income for both 
the wife or female partner and the husband or male partner. Using lower bounds 
and middle points of the household income categories gave very similar regression 
results. The wife or female partner’s income relative to her husband or male partner’s 
is defined as the difference between wife or female partner’s income and husband or 
male partner’s income. Laporte, Schellenberg: Income management strategies of older couples in Canada
11
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (%).
Variables Mean Financial strategies
Allocative Pooled Separate
TOTAL – 20.3 56.9 22.9
Gender
Female 46.8 20.9 57.7 21.4
Male 53.2 19.5 55.9 24.6
Immigrant status – Male
Canadian born 76.8 19.5 55.9 24.6
Immigrant 23.2 22.7 60.2 17.1
Immigrant status – Female
Canadian born 77.9 19.7 56.0 24.2
Immigrant 22.1 22.3 59.8 18.0
Marital status
Common law 10.9 15.1 32.0 52.8
Married 89.1 20.9 59.9 19.2
Duration of actual relation
Less than 5 years 5.6 15.6 32.0 52.4
5 to 9 years 6.3 13.9 40.7 45.3
10 to 19 years 16.7 19.8 51.8 28.4
More than 20 years 71.4 21.3 61.4 17.3
Family type
Couple, no children 26.6 17.9 44.5 37.5
Empty nesters 48.3 21.3 62.0 16.6
Couple with children 22.5 20.9 62.1 17.0
Other couples 2.6 18.4 41.7 39.9
Previously married
No  77.6 20.9 60.4 18.7
Yes 22.4 18.2 44.5 37.3
Education – Male 
Postsecondary 55.0 18.4 57.6 24.0
No postsecondary 43.0 22.4 56.4 21.2
Unknown 1.5 28.5 42.9 28.6
Education – Female
Postsecondary 50.0 17.4 56.4 26.1
No postsecondary 48.0 23.1 57.7 19.2
Unknown 1.6 25.6 47.1 27.4
Income – Male
No income 1.3 37.9 52.9 9.2
$1 to $19,999 9.6 21.0 56.2 22.8
$20,000 to $39,999 23.0 21.4 55.5 23.1
$40,000 to $59,999 18.2 18.9 55.1 26.0
$60,000 to $100,000 15.8 18.8 56.5 24.7
Greater than $100,000 11.6 16.7 59.6 23.6
Unknown 20.6 21.8 59.2 18.9
Income – Female
No income 9.6 35.2 58.5 6.3
$1 to $19,999 26.5 22.2 58.4 19.4
$20,000 to $39,999 20.5 18.0 55.4 26.6
$40,000 to $59,999 11.5 14.7 51.1 34.2
$60,000 to $100,000 7.9 12.5 57.5 30.0
Greater than $100,000 5.5 13.5 55.6 31.0
Unknown 18.5 21.0 59.2 19.8
Relative income
Male’s income = Female’s income 18.6 16.6 55.4 28.0
Male’s income < Female’s income 13.6 17.3 53.7 29.0
Male’s income > Female’s income 46.3 21.6 57.5 20.9
Both incomes unknown 21.5 22.3 58.8 18.9
Province
Rest of Canada 75.0 21.1 59.0 19.9
Quebec 25.0 17.8 50.5 31.7
Language at home
French 23.5 17.2 50.3 32.5
English 67.0 20.4 58.6 21.1
Other 9.5 27.1 61.3 11.6
Note: There are 9,489 observations in the sample.Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
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Empirical strategies and results 
Our multivariate analysis proceeds in three steps. First, results from a multi-
nomial logit model are presented, in which the dependent variable is comprised 
of the three income management strategies. A second model is run on the same 
dependent variable, but both absolute and relative levels of education and income 
are included. This makes it possible to assess whether income management strate-
gies are correlated with the absolute or relative characteristics of individuals—an 
issue that is central to the intra-household bargaining perspective on economic 
behaviour. Finally, differences in the use of separate-income strategies among 
common-law and married couples are examined by means of a Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition. All models are calculated using bootstrap weights to correct vari-
ance estimates for survey design. Results are shown as “marginal effects,” along 
with the standard errors of the estimates and levels of statistical significance.
Multivariate regressions
Most coefficients in the analysis yield results consistent with expectations. Sex 
and age are two exceptions. The predicted probability of using a separate approach 
to income management is 2 percentage points higher among women than among 
men (Table 3). Given the data available from the GSS, one cannot determine 
whether this is attributable to how husbands and wives within the same couple 
perceive their finances, or whether this is attributable to other factors. A significant 
correlation between the age of the wife or female partner and the likelihood of 
using either a pooled or separate approach to income management was found as 
well. Again, no ready explanation can be found for this. Different categorizations 
of the age variables were used in earlier analyses but yielded similar results.13 Im-
migration status is correlated with income management strategies; the probability 
of using a separate approach is almost 3 percentage points lower among male im-
migrants than among their Canadian-born counterparts. A similar result is found 
using the alternative specification of immigration status. 
In terms of the characteristics of the relationship, a strong correlation is 
found between the duration of the relationship and income management strat-
egies. Compared with individuals who have been in their relationship less than 
five years, those in relationships of 10 to 19 years are about 14 percentage points 
less likely to separate their income, while those in relationships of more than 20 
years are almost 21 percentage points less likely to do so. Moreover, individuals in 
common-law unions are far more likely than those in legal marriages to separate 
their income—a difference of 15 percentage points—even after the duration of 
the relationship is taken into account. 
The presence of children—either currently or previously residing with the 
couple—is correlated with income management practices. Compared with couples 
who have never had children, empty-nesters are less likely to separate their income 
13. For example, one might hypothesize that receipt of Old Age Security benefits at age 65 
provides elderly women with an independent, personal source of income over which they 
prefer retaining control, and thereby increases the propensity to use at least a partially separate 
approach to finances. However, a variable identifying women who were younger than age 65 
and women who were older than age 65 did not provide support for this hypothesis.Laporte, Schellenberg: Income management strategies of older couples in Canada
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Table 3. Multinomial logit performed on income management strategies (base 
model).
Allocative Pooled Separate
marginal 
effect
standard 
error
marginal 
effect
standard 
error
marginal 
effect
standard 
error
Female −0.009 0.011 −0.014 0.027 0.023* 0.010
Male’s age 0.000 0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Female’s age −0.001 0.001 −0.005* 0.003 0.002* 0.001
Male immigrant  0.007 0.018 0.020 0.042 −0.027† 0.015
Female immigrant −0.011 0.017 0.006 0.039 0.006 0.016
Common-law −0.012 0.019 −0.142** 0.031 0.154** 0.019
Duration of relation (less than 5 years)
5 to 9 years −0.033 0.022 0.054 0.035 −0.021 0.030
10 to 19 years 0.019 0.025 0.116** 0.045 −0.135** 0.024
More than 20 years 0.020 0.027 0.185** 0.045 −0.205** 0.026
Family type (couple, no children)
Empty nesters 0.005 0.016 0.061† 0.036 −0.066** 0.015
Couple with children 0.022 0.020 0.077† 0.039 −0.099** 0.017
Other couples 0.038 0.041 0.028 0.062 −0.066* 0.034
Previously married 0.005 0.018 −0.012 0.037 0.007 0.014
Education
Male (no postsecondary)
With postsecondary −0.027* 0.012 0.004 0.026 0.023* 0.009
Unknown education 0.098† 0.050 −0.072 0.089 −0.026 0.027
Female (no postsecondary)
With postsecondary −0.027** 0.012 −0.009 0.027 0.035** 0.010
Unknown education 0.048 0.047 −0.034 0.087 −0.014 0.026
Income
Male ($20,000 to $39,999)
Reports no income 0.175* 0.075 −0.024 0.113 −0.151** 0.020
$1 to $19,999 −0.013 0.019 0.009 0.046 0.004 0.018
$40,000 to $59,999 −0.011 0.017 −0.004 0.034 0.016 0.015
$60,000 to $100,000 −0.010 0.019 0.005 0.039 0.006 0.015
Greater than $100,000−0.021 0.022 0.027 0.051 −0.006 0.019
Income unknown −0.010 0.032 0.023 0.078 −0.012 0.028
Female ($1 to $19,999)
Reports no income 0.135** 0.041 −0.016 0.067 −0.119** 0.011
$20,000 to $39,999 −0.035* 0.015 −0.017 0.035 0.052** 0.014
$40,000 to $59,999 −0.059** 0.017 −0.058 0.037 0.117** 0.020
$60,000 to $100,000 −0.077** 0.020 −0.005 0.050 0.082** 0.022
Greater than $100,000−0.069** 0.023 −0.029 0.053 0.098** 0.025
Income unknown −0.015 0.031 −0.008 0.081 0.023 0.028
Language (English in rest of Canada)
French in Quebec −0.043** 0.013 −0.063* 0.025 0.106** 0.013
French in rest of 
Canada −0.039 0.032 −0.028 0.071 0.068* 0.032
English in Quebec 0.011 0.040 −0.103 0.065 0.091* 0.036
Other language in 
Quebec
0.020 0.063 0.016 0.137 −0.036 0.042
Other language in rest 
of Canada 
0.056† 0.034 −0.026 0.063 −0.030 0.022
Note: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Omitted categories in parentheses.Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
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(a difference of almost 7 percentage points) and more likely to pool it. Similarly, the 
likelihood of using a separate approach is lower among couples who have children 
currently residing with them, whether the children were born to both spouses or 
partners (a difference of 10 percentage points) or to only one of the spouses or part-
ners (a difference of 7 percentage points). Finally, while other studies have reported 
that the separation of income is positively correlated with one or both spouses or 
partners having a prior marriage, this is not the case in the multivariate results.14 
Education is correlated with the type of income management strategy used. 
The predicted probability of using a separate approach to income is higher among 
women and men who have post-secondary credentials than among their coun-
terparts who do not (differences of about 4 percentage points and 2 percentage 
points, respectively). Conversely, men and women with post-secondary credentials 
are less likely than others to use an allocative system. When the education of wives 
relative to that of their husbands is included in the model, no significant correla-
tions are observed (Table 4); this suggests that it is absolute levels of education 
that matter, rather than relative levels between the spouses.
Income management strategies are also correlated with income, particularly 
with that of wives. When one of the spouses or partners is reported to have no 
income, the likelihood that the couple uses an allocative approach is substantially 
higher—almost 18 percentage points among men (relative to men with incomes 
of $20,000 to $39,999) and almost 14 percentage points among women (relative 
to women with incomes of $1 to $19,999).15 Aside from this correlation, income 
management strategies are not associated with the amount of income received by 
the husband or male partner. However, the likelihood of using a separate approach 
to income management is correlated with the income of the wife or female part-
ner. The likelihood of using a separate approach to income is about 5 percentage 
points higher among wives or female partners with incomes of $20,000 to $39,999 
and about 8 to 12 percentage points higher among wives or female partners with 
incomes over $40,000 than among wives or female partners with incomes of $1 
to $19,999. When the incomes of wives relative to their husbands’ are included in 
the model, the variable is not significant (Table 4). As with educational attainment, 
it is the absolute level of income rather than relative level between spouses that is 
correlated with income management strategies.
The final variable in the analysis captures regional and linguistic characteristics 
of individuals. The reference group for this variable is Anglophones residing out-
side Quebec.16 Compared with this group, Francophones residing outside Quebec 
are significantly more likely to use a separate approach to income management 
(a difference of 7 percentage points) as are Francophones residing in Quebec 
(a difference of 11 percentage points). However, while this suggests that there 
14. Among older couples, cohabitation (i.e., common-law status) may follow a previous 
marriage; this raises the possibility of overlap between these two variables. To assess 
this, the model was run with the common-law variable excluded and subsequently 
run with a variable combining common-law status and previous marriage. These 
specifications yielded the same result; that is, previous marriages remained insignificant. 
15. Different reference categories were used for men and women on the income variable.
16. Dummy variables for all the provinces in Canada were used in an earlier version of 
the analysis, but yielded results similar to the results yielded by the “Quebec–Rest of 
Canada” dummy. The latter was retained in the model for the sake of parsimony and 
ease of presentation.Laporte, Schellenberg: Income management strategies of older couples in Canada
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Table 4. Multinomial logit on income management strategies (supplementary 
model).
Allocative Pooled Separate
marginal 
effect
standard 
error
marginal 
effect
standard 
error
marginal 
effect
standard 
error
Immigrant status (both Canadian-born)
Immigrant male and 
Canadian-born female −0.010 0.021 0.025 0.051 −0.015 0.018
Canadian-born male 
and immigrant female −0.032 0.020 0.013 0.048 0.019 0.019
Both immigrant 0.009 0.021 0.020 0.049 −0.029 † 0.017
Absolute education
Male (no postsecondary)
With postsecondary −0.018 0.017 −0.003 0.037 0.021 † 0.012
Unknown education 0.092 0.300 0.038 0.558 −0.130 * 0.066
Female (no postsecondary)
With postsecondary −0.038 * 0.015 0.000 0.035 0.037 ** 0.013
Unknown education 0.033 0.266 0.092 0.656 −0.125 † 0.072
Relative education (Male’s education > Female’s education)
Male’s education = 
Female’s education −0.016 0.015 0.017 0.035 −0.002 0.013
Male’s education < 
Female’s education 0.026 0.020 −0.021 0.046 −0.005 0.018
Both education 
unknown −0.034 0.148 −0.205 0.237 0.239 0.279
Absolute income
Male ($20,000 to $39,999)
Reports no income 0.143 † 0.076 0.004 0.123 −0.147 ** 0.021
$1 to $19,999 −0.009 0.021 0.010 0.050 −0.001 0.019
$40,000 to $59,999 −0.012 0.017 −0.008 0.036 0.019 0.015
$60,000 to $100,000 −0.013 0.020 −0.001 0.043 0.014 0.017
Greater than $100,000 −0.018 0.025 0.016 0.062 0.002 0.023
Income unknown −0.085 0.056 0.069 0.165 0.016 0.058
Female ($1 to $19,999)
Reports no income 0.128 ** 0.040 −0.011 0.067 −0.117 ** 0.011
$20,000 to $39,999 −0.033 * 0.016 −0.014 0.037 0.047 ** 0.015
$40,000 to $59,999 −0.057 ** 0.019 −0.052 0.041 0.109 ** 0.022
$60,000 to $100,000 −0.081 ** 0.022 0.005 0.065 0.076 ** 0.027
Greater than $100,000 −0.067 * 0.030 −0.016 0.075 0.083 * 0.034
Income unknown −0.040 0.033 0.004 0.094 0.036 0.034
Relative income (Male’s income > Female’s income)
Male’s income = 
Female’s income −0.025 0.017 0.001 0.042 0.025 0.016
Male’s income < 
Female’s income 0.010 0.026 −0.018 0.056 0.008 0.022
Both incomes unknown 0.097 0.079 −0.065 0.165 −0.032 0.059
Notes: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Omitted categories in parentheses. Also included 
in the regression: female, age, common-law, duration of relation, family type, 
previously married and language.Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
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is a difference between official-language groups, it is also important to note that 
Anglophones in Quebec are also significantly more likely than Anglophones out-
side Quebec to use a separate approach to income—a difference of 9 percentage 
points. Hence, the results indicate that income management strategies are corre-
lated with both geographic and linguistic characteristics. 
Decomposition analysis
The greater prevalence of separate-income strategies among common-law 
than married couples certainly stands out. To gain a clearer perspective of the fac-
tors accounting for this difference, a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique is 
used to estimate the extent to which the between-group difference is attributable to 
socioeconomic characteristics. It may be, for example, that the prevalence of sepa-
rate-income strategies among common-law couples simply reflects the shorter du-
ration of these relationships. Results from this decomposition are shown in Table 5.
There is about a 33-percentage-point difference in the use of separate-income 
strategies between married and common-law couples. Differences in the socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the two groups account for 14 percentage points—or about 
42 per cent—of this overall difference (Table 5). In other words, if the common-law 
individuals in the sample had the same socioeconomic profile as the married individu-
als, the difference in the shares using a separate approach to income would decline 
from 33 percentage points to about 19 percentage points. Duration of relationship 
plays the largest role, accounting for about 8 percentage points, while family com-
position accounts for almost −3 percentage points. The fact that a disproportionate 
share of common-law individuals are Francophones (who are more likely to use a 
separate approach to income management) accounts for 1.7 percentage points of the 
difference, while the relatively large share of common-law couples residing in Quebec 
(where the separation approach is more prevalent) accounts for another 0.9 percentage 
points. Prior marriages and income characteristics account for another 2 percentage 
points, while demographic characteristics exert a modest countervailing influence.17
17. These decomposition results are based on the coefficients from the sample of married 
respondents. When coefficients from the sample of common-law respondents are 
Table 5. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition on married or common-law individuals’ 
use of separate approach to income management.
Percentage points
Raw difference 33.5
Explained portion – Total 14.0
Duration of relationship 8.3
Family composition  −2.8
Language 1.7
Quebec 0.9
Income 1.2
Prior relationships 0.8
Sex, age, immigration status and 
education 1.7
Unexplained portion  19.5Laporte, Schellenberg: Income management strategies of older couples in Canada
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The same technique can be used for couples residing in Quebec and the rest of 
Canada. As shown in Table 6, of the approximately 12 percentage point difference 
in the prevalence of separate income management strategies, just over 8 percentage 
points (or 67 per cent) is attributable to differences in the socioeconomic character-
istics of the two groups. Language status plays the largest role, accounting for 5.6 
percentage points of the 12.2 percentage point difference. Of course, the question 
of why Francophones are more likely than Anglophones to use a separate approach 
to income management remains. Attitudes regarding gender roles and values at-
tached to personal independence and autonomy are possible factors that have been 
included in studies done elsewhere (Vogler and Pahl 1993; Elizabeth 2001; Vogler 
et al. 2006; Yodanis and Lauer 2007a). The GSS does not contain information on 
these issues. In addition to language, the greater prevalence of common-law unions 
in Quebec accounts for 2.6 percentage points (or about one-fifth) of the greater 
prevalence of separate income strategies in that province.18 
Conclusions 
In light of the dramatic changes in the characteristics of couples over the last 
forty years, researchers from a variety of disciplines are re-examining how couples 
negotiate and manage a wide range of economic activities. The way that couples 
organize their income can be examined in these terms. While the broad categories 
used here likely do not capture adequately the complexity of the arrangements that 
couples use, they are suggestive of the degree of independence involved. The socio-
economic characteristics correlated with the income management strategies are also 
consistent with this interpretation. Given the focus of this paper on couples aged 
45 or older—a group largely characterized by long-term marital unions in which 
children are or have been present—one might reasonably expect income pooling to 
used, the results are similar. When one uses “common-law coefficients,” compositional 
characteristics account for 16.7 percentage points, or 50 per cent, of the difference in 
prevalence of the separate approach (compared with 14.0 percentage points, or 41 
per cent, when the “married” coefficients are used). In both approaches, relationship 
duration accounts for the largest share of the explained component.
18. These decomposition results are based on the coefficients from the sample of 
respondents living outside of Quebec. When coefficients from the sample of 
Quebec respondents are used, the explained portion of the difference is somewhat 
smaller—at 4.8 percentage points or 39.2 per cent of the total difference. This is 
largely due to the smaller coefficient for the French language dummy estimated from 
the Quebec sample (0.027) than the rest of Canada sample (0.065). 
Table 6. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition on Quebec and Rest of Canada 
individuals’ use of separate approach to income management.
Percentage points
Raw difference 12.2
Explained portion - Total 8.2
Language 5.6
Common-law status 2.6
Duration of relationship 0.6
All other variables −0.6
Unexplained portion  4.0Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
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be the most prevalent strategy. This is indeed the case, as 57 per cent of respondents 
pool all their money, with each taking out what he or she needs, and a further 20 per 
cent pool their income, with one spouse or partner managing and allocating it. The 
data in this study do not allow us to examine how these strategies correlate with the 
actual distribution of income between spouses or partners. However, even among 
older couples, income management strategies are often characterized by a degree of 
independence, with 23 per cent of the respondents in the sample either partially (8 
per cent) or completely (15 per cent) separating their incomes. 
The characteristics of the couple relationships matter a great deal in this re-
gard. As often noted in the research literature, separate-income strategies are more 
prevalent among common-law couples than among married couples—a raw dif-
ference of almost 34 percentage points. However, a considerable portion of this 
difference (42 per cent, or 14 percentage points) is attributable to socioeconomic 
characteristics that systematically differ between these groups—most notably, the 
duration of the relationship. The extent to which these characteristics account for 
between-group differences has not received much attention in the literature. Still, 
the majority of the married or common-law difference remains unaccounted for 
in the decomposition. Between-group differences in values and attitudes, such as 
independence, autonomy, perceived ownership of assets, and expectations regard-
ing the permanence of the relationship, may account for some of this.
The likelihood of using a separate approach to income management is strongly 
and positively correlated with the wife or female partner’s absolute income, but is 
not with the wife or female partner’s income relative to that of her spouse. While re-
source theory suggests that the relative contributions of spouses are the “key factor 
promoting more or less equal arrangements [within couples],” with the implication 
that “when couples earn equal amounts, they are more likely to manage their pooled 
income jointly” (Yodanis and Lauer 2007a: 1309, 1320), the results from this study 
do not support this view, as no significant correlation is evident between relative 
income and income management strategies. Several possible explanations may be ad-
vanced for the positive correlation between wife or female partner’s absolute income 
and the use of separate-income strategies, such as greater importance attached to 
independence or autonomy, desire to maintain control over personal income, and/
or perceived ownership of personal assets among higher-income women. Conve-
nience may also be a consideration, following Treas’s finding that couples adopt 
management strategies, in part, “…to minimize disputes, hassles, and annoyances—
the transaction costs of intimate exchanges” (1993: 732). 
The growing number of Canadians in second marriages or blended families 
raises the question of whether complex families have complex finances. The de-
scriptive results from this study are suggestive of such a relationship, as the share of 
individuals in blended families using a separate-income strategy is twice as large as 
the share of individuals in families with children born to both spouses or partners 
doing so (40 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively). However, the multivariate results 
indicate that it is the presence of children, regardless of parentage, that is posi-
tively associated with income pooling. Readers are reminded that the sample used in 
this study is restricted to individuals aged 45 or older; a sample of couples in their 
twenties and thirties may yield different results. The issue of complex families and 
complex finances is also reflected in the descriptive results from this study, which Laporte, Schellenberg: Income management strategies of older couples in Canada
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show that individuals with prior marriages are about twice as likely to use a sepa-
rate-income strategy as individuals with no prior marriages (37 per cent and 19 per 
cent, respectively). This is consistent with the findings in the literature. Again, how-
ever, this correlation is non-significant in the multivariate results, perhaps because 
a broader range of covariates is used here than that employed in most other stud-
ies. Interestingly, two of the characteristics most strongly and positively correlated 
with separate-income strategies—common-law status and women’s income—have 
changed dramatically in recent years. While this might appear suggestive of a trend 
towards this type of income management strategy, the analysis presented above is 
based on data from a single point in time, and offers no evidence regarding trends.
Our results underscore the extent to which income management strategies 
differ between Francophones and Anglophones, and between Anglophones living 
in Quebec and in the rest of Canada. In short, both geography and language matter. 
One might point to a number of explanations for these patters, such as differences 
in attitudes regarding the roles of women and men; differences in the importance 
attached to values such as personal independence and autonomy; and differences 
in legal provisions and social institutions. The GSS does not provide information 
to assess the importance, if any, of these factors.
The organization of income within households has several implications for 
public policy.19 The intra-household distribution of income has implications for the 
measurement of financial well-being. Measures of low income assume that in-
dividuals within families share resources equally and have the same standard of 
living. Hence, if a family’s income is below the low-income threshold, all of its 
members are identified as living in “straitened circumstances.” Because evidence 
on the intra-family distribution of income is not available, it is not possible to cal-
culate low-income rates differently. However, Phipps and Burton (1995) assessed 
the sensitivity of low-income rates to different assumptions of intra-family shar-
ing. Using 1992 data, they found that fathers and mothers in two-parent families 
with children had a low-income rate of 8.9 per cent under the assumption of equal 
sharing, and that the rate declined to 2.7 per cent for fathers and increased to 17.5 
per cent for mothers under an assumption of “minimal sharing.”20 Similarly, Wool-
ley and Marshall (1994) examined the aggregate distribution of household income 
and reported that an assumption of unequal intra-household sharing21 yields a Gini co-
efficient 27 per cent higher than is yielded by an assumption of equal sharing. The 
same point applies to income replacement rates among seniors (Larochelle-Coté et 
al. 2010), as estimates using couples or families as the unit of analysis assume that 
individuals within those units share the same standard of living, even though the 
replacement rates achieved by individual family members may differ. 
Income management strategies also have implications for the use of tax 
provisions. For example, couples who view their financial futures as inextricably 
linked may be more willing than others to contribute their own income into the 
retirement savings account of their spouse—either inside or outside of Spousal 
RRSP contribution provisions. Moreover, control by men or by women over the 
19. Phipps and Burton (1995, 1996) provide a broad discussion of the policy 
relevance of household approaches to  income, underscoring the relevance of new 
developments in the economics of the family to public policy.
20. Under the assumption that fathers and mothers each keep their own incomes separate.
21. That is, that there is inequality in control over financial flows.Canadian Studies in Population 38, No. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011)
20
family finances may influence the level of personal savings. There is a large litera-
ture suggesting that men are more likely to spend income under their control, on 
alcohol and cigarettes, for example. Phipps and Wolley (2008) found that savings 
can be added to the men’s expenditure list. However, they also find that, in cases 
where women control the family finances, they do not use their control to save for 
themselves. They found a negative correlation between female control over family 
finances and both the probability and level of RRSP holdings.
As well, the strategies that couples use to organize and manage their incomes 
have relevance from a legal perspective. For example, Treas (1993) found that 
American couples in which husbands are employed in “high-liability medical and 
legal professions” are more likely than others to use separate bank accounts. Given 
the elevated risks of such individuals being sued, she argued, couples use separate 
accounts as a potential defence against litigants. Treas also observed that couples’ 
use of separate bank accounts is lower in states with community property laws 
(1993: 731), and argued that this is consistent with expectations, since money in 
separate accounts is not treated as personal property under such legislation. Look-
ing at a small sample of couples in which one or both partners had been married 
previously, Burgoyne and Morison found that older couples with children from a 
previous marriage were more likely than others to separate their incomes, and that 
this was “…especially marked in the way they wished their assets to be treated after 
their death” (1997: 363). This suggests that, for older individuals in complex family 
formations, estate planning and the laws governing it are factors influencing the 
organization of their income. 
Using an integrated collective household model, Chiappori et al. (2011) found 
that changes in alimony rights by province produce important implications for cou-
ples in Canada. They find that obtaining the right to petition for alimony upon sepa-
ration for cohabitating couples led women to reduce their labour force participation 
as changes in the law increased their power to negotiate within the household. Wom-
en in already formed cohabitating couples were more likely to attend school and stop 
working, and less likely to work full-time, whereas the men were more likely to work 
and less likely to have work interruptions. These results hold for any cohabitating 
couples over time but do not apply to individuals who were married, because mar-
ried couples were already granted these rights before the new legislation. Couples 
entering a cohabitating relationship after the new laws were affected differently.
Overall, this study provides an opportunity to look at how couples arrange their 
incomes, and documents considerable variation in this regard. The data used cannot 
explicitly tell us about how equitably incomes are shared between spouse or part-
ners, or whether there are differences in the living standards of household members. 
These issues are relevant to public policy, but information remains scarce in this area.
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